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Abstract
With the development of technology revolving around Unmanned Aerial Systems
(UAS), UAS are becoming more widely used across a variety of applications. In every
scenario, the system in question needs to have very distinct requirements and specifi-
cations, many of which revolve around safety and reliability. As such, these systems
need to provide mechanisms in order to handle different attacks by adversaries on
the outside. Since these systems have the ability to operate in many different flight
modes according to their mission, detection and mitigation of the attacks become
increasingly difficult over time. Cyber-attacks and their focuses are often evolving,
and as a result, existing mitigation solutions slowly become obsolete. Many solu-
tions that exist involve an intrusive solution or embedded software, which provide
another attack surface for adversaries to and gain entry. Here, a hierarchical embed-
ded cyber-attack detection system is explored and implemented, providing different
methodologies and strategies for handling both cyber-attacks and hardware faults
and failures on a hardware and information level.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert H. Klenke, Ph.D
Title: Professor, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the evolving technology surrounding unmanned aerial systems over the years,
these systems have become increasing versatile. As such, the applications of these
systems have expanded over several fields in industry, including civilian, medical and
military. In these respective fields, the concept of safety and reliability are heavily
emphasized and extremely important. Over time, the research of UAS has shifted fo-
cus to improving safety and preserving mission-critical functionality. In safety-critical
systems and applications, a failure of any kind will often result in catastrophic con-
sequences. The same applies for mission-critical systems. In order to prevent these
situations, these systems need to provide different mechanisms and solutions to detect
hardware faults and cyber-attacks and minimize the catastrophic failures. As the ca-
pabilities of UAS and cyber-attacks targeting unmanned systems evolve, the existing
solutions safeguarding legacy unmanned systems become obsolete. As a result, more
intensive solutions requiring quicker interventions are needed, especially for systems
that can potentially cause harm to humans and the environment. Methodologies for
monitoring a system in real-time is explored and implemented.
An unmanned aerial system is often best described as a cyber-physical system.
This idea involves the integration of physical components of a system (sensors and ac-
tuators) and the cyber components of a system (algorithms and computation flows).
On any cyber-physical system, the “correct and functional” operation of the system de-
pends greatly on its interface and interconnections with the many on-board modules.
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For unmanned aerial systems, sensors and actuators provide data to the main flight
controller as well as their respective communication buses. A general architecture for
a UAS is shown in figure 1-1. In systems that perform missions autonomously, orien-
tation and geolocation data is critical. Sensors that provide orientation data, such as
a gyroscope or an accelerometer, or sometimes any combination of the two to form
an inertial measurement unit (IMU) or a motion processing unit (MPU), will need to
function correctly to ensure false data is not sent to the controller. Without them,
the flight controller will have no reference to determine its direction or orientation for
its mission. The UAS will also need to continuously know its location precisely, so
the presence of a functional GPS module will be needed. Without these components,
the UAS will be rendered useless due to its inability to determine its orientation and
location to carry out its mission. Each individual sensor will communicate with the
flight control system through different protocols to perform its function.
Figure 1-1: General Architecture of a Unmanned Aerial System
A UAS can be represented as a cyber-physical system. The functional require-
ments can be broken down into required subcomponents, each of which need to func-
tion correctly and independently. When modeling and designing an unmanned sys-
tem, each individual underlying subcomponent that the main flight controller depends
11
on is identified. This allows for proper design and implementation in the main flight
control system to ensure that the most accurate and up-to-date data is always ob-
tained. Every dependent subcomponent must be highlighted. A similar method can
be used to identify the vulnerabilities associated with the system.
In general, an unmanned system comprises of a series of subcomponents: commu-
nication networks, sensors, and actuators. These subcomponents work together to be
able to obtain data from each other and play a critical role in correct functionality.
However, the inclusion of each subcomponent introduces an additional vulnerability.
With communication networks, adversaries have the ability to perform data injection
via packet sniffing and false data injection. For example, in systems that communicate
live flight data with the ground control station, adversaries can perform a man-in-
the-middle attack, packet sniffing the data going back and forth and manipulating
the data before sending it back out.
The sensor itself can also act as a gateway for other cyber-attacks. With a given
sensor, there can be multiple points in the supply chain process that allows for in-
jection of malicious software. Although these sensors can be simplistic, the firmware
or circuitry can be modified (with or without malicious intent) to output data that
is not true to its expected behavior. As a result, supply chain attacks can be harder
to detect without further knowledge aside from how the sensor is behaving over the
communication bus and the information that is being returned. This would require
a higher level of processing to be able to detect valid anomalies.
In Figure 1-2, there are two main general vulnerabilities that can be identified
from each main subcomponent. The functionality of an unmanned system depends
on its ability to obtain reliable data on its vehicle such as airspeed, geolocation,
altitude or orientation, so it is critical that the flight controller is able to (1) obtain
valid data from each individual subcomponent and (2) obtain reasonable data from
from the subcomponent. There is a difference between valid data and reasonable
data. With valid data, the goal is to verify whether or not the data being returned is
actually what is being reported and follows the constraints set by the manufacturer,
while reasonable data is data that makes sense when it taken into context. If data
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being returned indicates activity on the sensor, but in reality no action is being taken,
then the data received is perceived as valid but unreasonable, so long as the data is
within range and specification. However, if the data received is is out of range, then
this shows invalid data. This is important, especially when dealing with sensors that
require further processing upon receiving data. For conversion operations requiring
calculations based on values returned, valid data is especially important to account
for specific data types and ranges. If invalid data is reported, results from calculations
depending on this data will be incorrect.
Figure 1-2: Devices and Their Communication Buses
The requirement that the main flight controller needs to be able to obtain correct
data from its subcomponents identifies two big potential vulnerabilities: the failure
of a communication bus and the failure of the sensor itself. The failure of a bus can
be as simple as an issue with the physical connection: a wire could be incorrectly
connected or perhaps the master device can request data from an unknown address,
13
forcing the slave to hang the bus. Timing issues can arise, and cause problems getting
correct data across. In any case, the failure of the bus is detrimental, as it can also
hang the flight controller itself.
Previously, a hierarchical embedded cyber-attack detection (HECAD) system was
outlined that can detect attacks and faults at multiple levels of abstraction [1].
HECAD contains four levels of detection: the hardware resource integrity level, the
information integrity level, the functional integrity level, and the execution integrity
level.
The first level involves detection at the physical hardware level. This allows for
validation that the bus protocol is working as intended, and any malfunctions such
as timing issues or glitches and unexpected behavior are detected and alerted. At
this level of abstraction, the hardware validation knows nothing about the device on
either end of the bus. It knows only about the configuration and operation of the bus
(baud rate, transmission speeds, addresses, etc).
At the information level, another detection module takes into account the func-
tions of the devices on the ends of the communication bus. Here, information received
to and from either device are validated against what is expected. As a result, this
abstraction layer is very tightly coupled with its respective device. Addresses, data
ranges, and commands are checked, making sure that they fall within the range of
what is expected. If there are custom packet protocols developed to communicate
with the ground control system, all data coming across the communication and data
link is verified to match the information packet described.
Since the hardware and information level checking levels are designed as data and
configuration verification for each sensor or other devices, a higher level detection
module is required to detect the less obvious and more complex system-level attacks
and faults. At the functional integrity level, more complex processing is required
within the HECAD processing system on the validated data to ensure proper system-
level functionality. More computationally intensive and in-depth algorithms that
are less feasible to implement in hardware or easily implemented in software are
implemented here, as well as any other possible implementations such as artificial
14
intelligence solutions.
The combination of these multiple levels of detection in hardware and software
provides a global, minimally intrusive and tightly-coupled fault and cyber-attack
detection system that detects anomalies on a hardware, information, and functional
level of operation. By isolating HECAD from the main system, the chances that an
adversary is able to attack the HECAD system itself is minimized. The goal is for
the HECAD system to detect attacks from a bottom-up approach as well as from
a higher level point of view. HECAD is designed so that integration into the flight
controller is minimal, and would prevent additional attack surfaces. HECAD operates
independently to do cross-checking, verification and validation of functionality across
subsystems in real-time.
Contributions of this thesis
The work completed in this thesis contributes to implementing a portion of a
hierarchical embedded attack detection system for Flight Control Systems (FCS) of
small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS). While some techniques exist for detect-
ing cyber-attacks from a high-level perspective (such as neural network detection as
explored in [2] and [3], malware detection using embedded decoy processes [4], mon-
itoring of power and heat characteristics [5] or control-flow analysis [6]), additional
techniques are needed for detecting different types of cyber-attacks at different levels
in an sUAS. While well-coordinated attacks often occur at a higher level by target-
ing multiple parts of a system, this work describes methods for detecting attacks at
the hardware and information level using a bottom-up approach. These methods
lay the groundwork for breaking cyber-attacks down into smaller steps at different
levels in the system for detection and mitigation. These lower-level hardware and
information-level detection techniques were implemented using a field-programmable-
gate-array (FPGA) along with an FCS and its respective on-board sensor components
that communicate using the universal asynchronous receiver transmitter (UART) and
inter-integrated circuit (I2C) communication buses.
15
Chapter 2
Background and Related Works
2.1 Unmanned Aerial System - General Architecture
An unmanned aerial system (UAS) or an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is an
example of a cyber-physical system whose operation highly depends on the correct
operation of the on-board components such as sensors and actuators. When UAS
were introduced to the industry, a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) UAS used for ev-
eryday recreational purposes generally did not have many self-piloting features that
allowed them to fly without user intervention. Over the years, as size, weight and
performance capabilities evolved, more and more features involving automated flight
modes became available. Hovering, flips, and object-following are a few examples.
Systems such as the DJI Mavic or the Skydio 2 are able to perform tasks such as
following a subject in video through mountains and forests or taking pictures upon
a voice command. In order to be able to successfully perform these tasks without
entering a failed state of the aircraft, the on-board components need to be dependable
in the presence of failures and cyber-attacks by providing correct data and feedback
on the status of the vehicle at all times. These components generally involve image
processing units, graphics processing units, camera sensors, GPS units, inertial move-
ment units, central processing units, and other sensors and actuators, many of which
form subsystems. By integrating these physical components that provide data con-
stantly and correctly, unmanned systems now have a highly-reliable, highly-available
16
system of sensors and actuators. The flight controller, which generally has a main
microcontroller or processor and various necessary peripherals, manages all of the
data processing and storage as well as communication between subsystems and other
parts of the unmanned system.
2.2 Vulnerabilities of UAS
During the planning and development of an unmanned system, the most important
aspects of the system are considered: safety and security. The following defines several
terms related to the security of a UAS.
1. Vulnerability - The presence of a component that can be used by attackers to
gain entry into the system
2. Safety - The state of the UAS being uncompromised and safeguarded against
external and internal threats
3. Security - The presence of several safeguards designed to protect the operational
state of the UAS
4. Mitigation technique - Actions taken in response to finding a threat or compro-
mised safety / security
5. Spoofing - The process of tricking a sensor or device by attacking the sensor’s
or device’s point of reference
6. Attack - The process of introducing errors and unfamiliar information and com-
mands into the system through exploitation of different vulnerabilities
7. Injection - The process of introducing different types of malware / unfamiliar
information, commands, or operations into the system intentionally under a
controlled testing environment
8. Threat - The existence of unfamiliar information, commands, or operations seen
from the system’s point of view
17
9. Attack Surface - The different ways that the attacker can gain access to the
system [7]
With aerial systems, there are several requirements put into place regarding oper-
ation and flight. The biggest concern is the ability for the UAS to not lose control and
fall out of the sky. While this may not be the case for many industrial commercial off
the shelf (COTS) drones, sometimes the security of the systems is overlooked. Aside
from the very basic requirements of an unmanned aerial system (vehicles need to have
security mechanisms in place to prevent UAS from falling out of the sky and other
requirements to prevent injury), a more in-depth analysis is often not considered.
Traditionally, the development of a UAS involves building the drone to operation,
then tackling the problems involved with security from a top-down overview [8]. This
approach is often not enough, considering the constant evolving cyber attacks that
involve targeting different parts of an unmanned system. Depending on the goal of
the adversary, attacks can either bring the entire vehicle down, or perform enough ma-
nipulation to throw the state of the UAS into chaos (such as manipulation orientation
or positional data either though sensor spoofing or false data injection).
The concept of security within many systems and subsystems can be classified
into four broad areas: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, and Authentication.
1. Confidentiality - The confidentiality is the measure that that determines who
has access to what information. Generally, rules are put into place to determine
ownership of specific data, along with evaluating the importance of data and
the detrimental effects of it being compromised.
2. Integrity - Integrity is a measure used to verify the integrity or authenticity of
data from a source. For data that is transmitted between devices, there is gen-
erally a communication protocol along with specific data constraints provided
by manufacturers. Often times, there are built-in mechanisms to verify integrity
of data during transmission to ensure that the data has not been manipulated
or changed.
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3. Availability - Availability is a measure that is used to ensure that all systems
communicating between devices are reliably able to access data at any point
in time. Placing measures that ensures reliable communication for data at any
point in time, downtime between communication devices are minimized.
4. Authentication - Authentication is used to verify that the devices attempting
to communicate with each other are really the devices they claim to be. This
is usually done with addressing or identification bytes.
2.2.1 Naturally Occurring Faults vs. Cyber-Attacks
In systems such as a UAS, naturally occurring faults can arise. For example, single-
event upsets (SEU) may occur, especially in systems that spend time in high altitudes
where cosmic rays can induce naturally occurring faults. When this happens, a bit or
multiple bits within a device may be affected, changing the data to be reported to the
requesting device. In this case, data that is then reported appears to be manipulated.
However, the issue here is that it is difficult to differentiate naturally occurring faults
from direct cyber-attacks. For example, assuming that an adversary has successfully
injected malware that is intended to scramble the data being reported into a sensor
by randomly flipping bits, then this data that is being passed through a checker has
no way of verifying that the data is indeed from an attacked sensor as opposed to
environmental noise such as an SEU, since the data will appear to be scrambled.
Unless there is a method to identify patterns that are associated with cyber-attacks
as opposed to natural faults, it is extremely difficult to differentiate between the two.
If the user had information regarding how data is being scrambled by a compromised
sensor, then more information will be available for this. However, the chances are
very low for the checker to know attack information, especially with well-coordinated
attacks performed with the intention of hijacking sensors and systems where the
attacker may be able to inject malicious information. Well-coordinated attacks will
not follow the assumptions that the system will know information about outside
attacks, injected malware, or that the attacks target a single sensor. As a result, a
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detection scheme attempting to differentiate between natural faults and cyber-attacks
will be more successful in determining any kind of discrepancy, rather than attempting
the classify the type of discrepancy.
2.2.2 System Security and Attack Surfaces
The security of a UAS is often described by several attributes, including how easily
attackable the system is (susceptibility), as well as how the system can be exploited
(accessibility). These two attributes describe the different actions on different attack
surfaces. Often times, attacks that are well coordinated and have extensive attack
surfaces are more successful against systems. In order to combat the different types of
attacks, the general operations of the attack surfaces need to be analyzed. Generally,
attacks involve some form of extraction, manipulation, and then reinsertion. This is
especially true for attacks on wireless communication links or communication buses
if access has been gained through either a man-in-the-middle attack or malicious
malware injection into the system / sensor.
In Figures 1-1 and 1-2 in the previous chapter, there are multiple attack surfaces
on a UAS. The first involves attacking the sensors and actuators themselves. Since
unmanned systems rely heavily on components that provide data on orientation and
position, the downtime of these components can result in fatal operation of the aerial
system. With many different sensors, their correct operation depends on the correct
functionality of a reference point. For example, GPS modules receive signals from four
or more satellites, completing a calculation that informs the receiver module where
they are geographically located. Satellites constantly transmit the time in which a
signal is sent, and based on the difference between the time the signal is received
by the GPS module and the time the signal is sent by the satellite, the receiver can
figure out the distance to each GPS satellite using trilateration. A spoofing attack can
work when the attacker can successfully replicate these satellite signals, and transmit
them locally. Since UAS are typically flying closer to the ground, it is possible that
GPS signals from the attackers can be picked up and override the GPS signals from
the satellites. In theory, this is possible. However, because unmanned systems in
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the air are often moving and constantly changing, an active spoofing attack will be
very difficult, especially at higher altitudes and speeds. In section 4, a mitigation
technique for this is issue explored.
In many mobile phones, there are often software applications that allow for chang-
ing the device location, primarily through offering an alternative set of coordinates
to the operating system rather than relying on the data received from the GPS mod-
ules. On an unmanned system, a similar situation may occur. Attackers can attack
by sneaking in malicious software or firmware to the on-board to processor that either
manipulates the sensor to transmit incorrect data or overrides the sensor’s data and
inserts its own set of malicious data. Frequently, the firmware gets into the system
through an external source. Typically, these involve an attacker cloning an original
source of firmware and modifying the firmware to be re-distributed, the source comes
from the developers themselves (either with malicious intent or simply lack of test-
ing and verification), or source becomes corrupted through distribution through the
many points of contact (manufacturer, distributor, assembly or during programming)
[1]. This situation would be more often found in situations where a sensor does not
rely on an external reference point, such as an airspeed sensor. These sensors rely on
factory-written data in the calibration registers to be able to provide accurate data.
Malware within the sensor is able to manipulate the reported data or change the
calibration data.
In any generic unmanned system, there will typically be a communication path
between the on-board flight controller and the ground control station. Frequently,
when there are missions that need to be completed by the UAS, the ground controller
will send mission data (coordinates, way-points, geolocation data, etc) to the UAS,
and the UAS may send additional data back. Generally, communication between the
UAS and the ground controller will have a very specific protocol and data format.
Because of this, attackers may sit in between the two points and listen in on the
protocol. If the data being sent is not encrypted, it will only make it easier for the
attacker to figure out the protocol. Once the protocol has been figured out, the
attacker can either replicate or manipulate the data and resend the data back out,
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performing a man-in-the-middle network attack on the flight controller.
Additionally, because the ground controller generally consists of a program that is
provided and maintained by third parties, there are no guarantees that the software
used in the ground control station is not compromised. In the event that an attacker
is able to trick the user into downloading a malicious version of the ground controller,
the attacker can use the ground controller to send malicious commands and data
to the flight controller. If the ground controller is developed by a user, any insecure
connection to the internet provides a point of entry for the attacker to inject malicious
data into the ground control station. A known instance of a compromised ground
control station is described in [9] and [10], where an attacker successfully implanted
keylogger malware into a ground station to be able to steal key information. A similar
process can be done here, especially if information is stored unsecured.
The use of an encryption method for communication will only provide further se-
curity between the points of communication. For an XBee communication transceiver,
there exists a built-in Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption that can be
enabled. However, this requires that the user still provide an encryption key on ei-
ther end of the transmission link. If this information is stored on the ground control
station and the flight controller, the attacker can access this information if there is
an unsecured connection to the internet from the ground control station. AES is a
symmetric encryption algorithm, meaning the same key is used to decrypt and en-
crypt the block of data. As a result, if an attacker gains access to the key, they can
successfully encrypt and decrypt the data going both ways. With this information,
the attacker now has full control of the communication link, given that they are able
to determine the protocol and packet formation standard.
2.2.3 Types of Attacks on Unmanned Aerial Systems
In general, the failure of a UAS can be classified into two broad domains: UAS
mission-related failures and UAS safety-related failures. Mission-related failures are
related to the objectives or mission revolving around the user or autonomous missions.
On the other hand, safety-related failures are related to the failure of constraints put
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in place to ensure safety to people, environment and infrastructure. Of these two
domains, there is potential for overlap. Mission-related failures can often be caused
by a failure of a component that does not provide correct data at any given point
in flight time. For a UAS, this means that a component or components have failed,
either through a hardware fault or a direct cyber-attack. On unmanned systems,
an example of a fault can result from single event upsets caused by cosmic rays.
Most commonly seen in systems in space, these events can happen more often to
aerial systems than ground systems due to their constant high altitude. When these
events happen, information provided by the component can be incorrect and will
result in a failed operation of the UAS. For direct cyber attacks, the manipulation
of the information coming off of the sensor are often controlled attacks. If the goal
is to divert the aircraft away from the area of operation (AO), then an attacker may
spoof a combination of sensors by manipulating the reference points to divert it in a
certain direction. However, this is very unlikely since manipulation of sensors without
external reference points will need to be from the supply chain level. With this
approach, an unmanned system with multiple sensors from the same distributor or
manufacturer will provide an advantage to the attacker. In either case, the presence
of a faulty sensor or a direct cyber-attack will place limits into the performance
requirements of the aircraft in order to complete its mission.
On the other hand, failure of safety constraints can result from faulty sensors.
With the failure of orientation and positional sensors such as the IMU or a GPS
module, the main points of reference for the UAS to maintain its position have been
lost. The UAS then has no way of knowing how to stay upright. The same effect
can be achieved by attacks on sensors by manipulating the reference points of the
sensors. For sensors such as GPS, attacks can be performed via spoofing or jamming.
As explained previously, the data reported by the sensor can be ignored and data
from a secondary source can be utilized. In the event that an attack is able to
insert malicious code prior to the flight, attacks can replace the incoming data with
malicious data, performing a false data injection via malware infection or a supply
chain attack.
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Furthermore, a successful attempt to insert malicious code allows for attacks on
the source of the controller, or rather the processing platform itself. The presence of
malicious code can manipulate the behavior of the software and hardware modules
on-board. These involve forcing the flight controller to behave in unexpected ways
(running malicious or alternative code or hanging communication buses). Once the
firmware has successfully entered the system, there are several approaches that the
firmware can take. The firmware can run malicious code, forcing resources to be held
up or causing the battery to drain (resource locking and sleep deprivation), insert
malicious data into the local database or memory (database and false data injection),
or force malicious code to manipulate data processing, actuator control algorithms,
and memory management.
Outside of the flight controller, there is the possibility of attack between two com-
munication points. As most unmanned systems communicate over some form of a
network, there are many different types of attacks through a wireless entry point.
Between the flight controller and the ground control station, attackers are able to
perform a man-in-the-middle attack, where the attacker listens in on the communi-
cation protocol. If the series of data is encrypted as described above, attackers may
perform a brute-force attack on encryption algorithms to determine the key used to
encrypt the data. With any knowledge of a communication standard, attackers know
to look for a few sync bytes and a message length. The data can then be captured
and the communication standard can be broken down, allowing attackers to perform
replay and relay attacks. Furthermore, once the attackers know the protocol, they
are able to perform command injection or false data injection to manipulate the tasks
of the UAS. Alternatively, attacks can be carried out to perform denial-of-service
or communication jamming attacks by either dropping parts, if not all, of the data
packets going back and forth. Figure 2-1 summarizes a wide variety of attacks on
cyber-physical systems.
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Figure 2-1: List of CPS Exploits, Adapted from [8]
2.3 Hierarchical Embedded Cyber-Attack Defense Sys-
tem (HECAD)
In order to be able to address the issues above, the hierarchical embedded cyber-
attack detection (HECAD) system is implemented. HECAD consists of a multi-level
hierarchical hardware and software architecture [1] that is designed to monitor and
detect the many different hardware, information and functional faults and attacks as
discussed previously. Within the HECAD architecture there are four levels of abstrac-
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tion designed around detection at multiple levels of operation on a unmanned system.
This system is intended to verify mainly the integrity of information throughout the
many different subcomponents involved within the flight control system as described
in section 3. Figure 2-2 shows the general architecture of HECAD.
Figure 2-2: General HECAD Architecture in Zynq MPSoC
2.3.1 Hardware Resource Integrity Monitor
At the lowest level is the Hardware Resource Integrity Monitor (HRIM). The
HRIM is designed to monitor the operation of a module on one of the communication
ports: UART, I2C, and SPI. The HRIM monitors the hardware characteristics of a
sensor, such as the operation of the communication protocol, specifically to ensure
that the configuration of the protocol is the same on both the receiving and trans-
mitting ends, as well as to ensure the configuration does not change mid-operation.
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The HRIM sniffs data passively, and if an error in the communication bus has been
detected, a switch can be triggered, detaching the faulty sensor until it has been re-
paired or reset, or simply alerting the operator. The HRIM can be applied to different
applications, not just monitoring a hardware protocol.
2.3.2 Information Integrity Monitor
The next level up is the Information Integrity Monitor (I2M). As the name sug-
gests, the I2M continuously checks for the integrity of the data. Unlike the HRIM,
the I2M cannot be reused across different sensors. A dedicated I2M will need to be
developed on a case-by-case basis for each sensor. This is to ensure that the I2M will
be able to parse data from each different sensor and is designed to be independent
from every other on-board sensor. However, despite the independence from the dif-
ferent sensors, there is a dependence on the HRIM, as the I2M receives correct data
information from the HRIM. The purpose of the HRIM is to pull the data from the
sensor and package it for analysis, while the I2M uses the packaged data for verifica-
tion. In most cases, the data from each sensor will already be packaged into different
registers, and the only task from here will be to identify the registers and their re-
spective values. The I2M knows only about the data coming from the sensor that it
is designed for: the operational ranges, typical values, and expected values.
2.3.3 Functional Integrity Monitor
Next comes the Functional Integrity Monitor (FIM). The FIM monitors the op-
eration status of all of the sensors and actuators on-board from a higher level than
the HRIM or I2M. At this level, data is collected from the sensors and actuators as
well as the communication with the ground control station to ensure that there are
no gradual changes to the data in accordance to its mission and functional require-
ments. An attack that cannot be detected by the HRIM and I2M will be analyzed
at this level. As an example, an attack performed targeting a GPS spoof will allow
attackers to manipulate the reference point of a GPS module. This in turns allows
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for the attack to place their own GPS coordinates in the spoofing attack as desired.
Because it is a spoof attack, the HRIM and the I2M will not detect the attack, since
the data received by the GPS module will still transmit correctly over a specific com-
munication protocol (UART) and will be within a reasonable range. A slow drift in
the coordinates are categorized as correct data by both the HRIM and I2M. The data
reported by the GPS module will be different according to the attackers’s desired co-
ordinates. With this, the attacker has the opportunity to slowly drift the coordinates
away, causing the UAS to drift as a reaction to the change in coordinates. A sudden
and large change in the GPS coordinates will be caught by the I2M. From here, the
FIM detects that there has been a drift in the GPS coordinates, and uses another
metric for validation. The goal of the FIM is to be able to detect changes that are
forbidden at both the sensor / actuator level and the state of the flight controller
itself but passes the lower level checks implemented at the HRIM and the I2M.
2.3.4 Execution Integrity Monitor
On top of the HRIM, I2M, and FIM comes the Execution Integrity Monitor. At
the highest level of the HECAD hierarchy, the goal of the EIM is to be able to monitor
and detect abnormal changes to the hardware resources used by the flight controller.
While the goal of the HRIM, I2M (hardware and information in programmable fabric),
and the FIM (functional level in software) is to detect lower level faults and attacks,
the presence of malicious firmware and injected false data may not be caught by those
respective monitors if they match the configurations and data formats of the sensors,
especially if the firmware resides in the flight controller itself. Thus, the introduction
of the EIM allows for the monitoring of the execution state and resources of the flight
controller itself, including but not limited to: resource utilizing, memory status, state
based operation, and event calculus. With resource utilization and memory status,
the EIM can determine if there is malicious or alternative code running on the flight
controller, resulting in unexpected behavior by the flight controller shown by the
resource consumption or memory status. If there is malicious code that runs an
alternative block of code that is not obvious to resource and memory metrics, then
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a change in the state based operation represented by a control flow graph [6] or an
event calculus model as explored in [11] can determine a potential fault within the
system. In [4], Sutton et al. describe the method of using decoy processes, where a
process is not intended to run in normal operating circumstances. If the presence of
malware triggers running of this process, then it shows the detection of the malware.
Furthermore, the access of specific resources such as a decoy file system or decoy I/O
and data that is only accessible through the decoy process indicates the presence of
malware. This can be used alongside an approach monitoring control flow as described
in [6], because the access of decoy resources indicates a change in the state. In order
for decoy processes to be effective, they should not consume as much resources as
the main flight controller. An additional metric that can be used to evaluate correct
execution characteristics exhibited by the flight controller. In [5], several power and
heat characteristics of a system were observed. Alongside a decoy process, this can
be used to ensure there is no change in the processing code of the flight controller.
2.3.5 Information Flow
The information flows upwards through the multiple levels of the hierarchy and
consists of both the data coming off of the sensor into the bus, and the error informa-
tion that causes an error to be detected. Going through the HRIM, the information
is packaged into bytes that can be interpreted in specific ways in the I2M. This infor-
mation does not contain configuration information such as start or stop bits in the
UART protocol or the acknowledge and not acknowledge bits in the I2C bus. This
configuration information is only used in the HRIM to verify that it is working cor-
rectly. In the I2M, every byte or bytes of data is taken and verified against the range
of data that is reported in the respective data sheet. If there needs to be a parser to
obtain the address and register of the data, this is also done here to ensure the slave
addresses and the register addresses are valid. If they are not, this information is sent
upwards to the FIM along with anything reported by the HRIM. The FIM then runs
a higher level of processing on the information, but ONLY on the correct forms of
data. Processing on incorrect data as determined on the lower levels of integrity will
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also yield incorrect data on the functional level.
2.4 Related Works
In [6], Stracquodaine et al. provide a novel approach of securing unmanned sys-
tems using real-time software functionality analysis. This allows for the system to
detect presence of any faulty malware within the flight control system (autopilot and
operating system). By identifying internal code events (locations in the program’s
logic) as well as the software events, the flow of the system can be modeled and a
detection methodology is used to identify intrusion. Their solution is to implement
an embedded software solution within the flight controller itself. The issue with this
is that providing a software based, embedded solution provides a way for the attacker
to work around being detected. The presence of a profile is meant to safeguard this
issue, but an embedded solution can go down along with the whole system if the at-
tack is firmware based and injected long before the main autopilot code can even have
the chance to run. The approach here would represent the functionality intended at
the functional and executional integrity levels of the HECAD system.
A more independent approach is described in [12]. Sabaliauskaite and Mathur ex-
plores the use of intelligent checkers to verify the functionality of the specific devices
that it is measuring. In this paper, an intelligent checker (IC) is used in a cyber-
physical system control loop, where the data from an actuator is fed into a controlled
process. The output of the controlled process feeds into both the sensor and the
intelligent checker. The intelligent checker would ensure that the process makes valid
commands. This can be adapted to be used on a UAS, and would be checking com-
mands and operations from the flight controller as well as from the sensor. The
purposes of the intelligent checker is to be able to measure various parameters such
as temperature, light, and pressure. Depending on the sensor, certain parameters can
vary as well. For GPS sensors, parameters that can be introduced are signal strength
and direction of arrival, since they can be the most important factors in distinguishing
real and spoofed GPS signals [13]. An attempt to spoof a GPS signal will exhibit
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large changes in either of those parameters, and therefore an intelligent checker will
be useful. In detecting the GPS spoofing signals, machine learning or the information
from the narrow band receivers can also be used [14]. While these parameters are ap-
plicable for large CPS systems, the use of this for an unmanned system will introduce
more environmental issues and less applicable parameters, specifically noise that is
emitted by the on-board components or environment (vibrational noise or environ-
mental noise). Therefore, this approach works well when the intended measurements
are represented digitally. If this concept were to be introduced, it would sit within
the hardware resource integrity monitor of the HECAD system.
Another approach to identifying abnormal functionality in a sensor network is
by introducing neural networks. In general, neural networks prove to be very useful
in identifying patterns and recognizing characteristics. While many of these uses
generally revolve around a static set of data (i.e. images), an adapted neural network
can be used to look for trends and characteristics in time-based data. In [15], Shin et
al. introduce the use of Long Short-Term Memory and Gated Recurrent Unit (LSTM,
GRU) neural networks to identify attacks using sensory information measured during
real time. In this paper, it is shown that the computational cost is very low, with
an execution time of 0.002104 seconds for LSTM and 0.001645 seconds for GRU
approaches for detection. The neural networks generally need to have a model that
considers the information correct and requires data sets that correspond with mission
data. If mission data is missing, it is hard for the neural network to isolate correct
versus incorrect sensor data.
In [16], Ding et al. explore the existing strategies to deal with falsely injected data:
bayesian detection with binary hypothesis, weighted least square, kalman filters, and
quasi-FDI. With the weighted least square approach, a framework is used to ensure
that the data being measured does not exceed a predetermined threshold values. This
is used as a way to ensure that a discrepancy in measurements are detected. For the
kalman filter approach, a version of the kalman filter that is existent on the flight
control system is adapted and modified, allowing for the processing of the raw sensor
data as well as the estimation of the aircraft’s physical state. By providing aircraft
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information, additional information can be used to verify the estimation.
In [2], a similar application is used when the authors trained a convolutional
neural network to identify abnormal events in a video. Their work was split into two
stages, the first of which extracts features from a batch of inputs, and the second
of which is used to detect abnormal features. The problem here though is that
the training of the neural network relies on the use of still images, and requires
a different approach when looking at time-series data such as sensor data. This
approach can be very useful when dealing with mission specific applications, but not
so much when working with free-fly operations. At the functional level, this can
be introduced as a secondary detection mechanism that runs in parallel with the
available existing solution. A similar approach is done in [3], where a new algorithm
is introduced to detect faulty data injected into a UAV. In this implementation, an
adaptive neural network structure is used and trained for fault detection. A different
approach is used when determining fault classification. Instead of using conventional
neural network procedures, a nonlinear observer output and sensor output is used to
estimate faults. For weight updates in the neural network, an embedded kalmann
filter is used to perform online tuning, allowing for quicker and more accurate attack
detection. Online training is different from traditional training methods such as batch
training. Batch training is when a large set of data is used for training, while online
training is used for new data that comes into the system on the fly [17].
In [18], Sedjelmaci et al. explore the implementation of a hierarchical detection
and response for cyber-attacks within a network of unmanned systems. In this paper,
the system explores detection of attacks such as GPS spoofing, jamming, and gray
/ black hole attacks. By verifying information at both UAS nodes and the ground
station, the intrusion detection system can identify the incoming attacks. This is a
rule based approach when looking for specific attacks. This is a different approach
from the HECAD system described above, as it spans across outside communications
networks (flight control system and ground control station). HECAD is embedded
within the flight control system, and monitors not only communications between
the flight controller and the ground controller, but also operations within the flight
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controller itself (sensor data, bus operations, and autopilot code).
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Chapter 3
Subsystems
3.1 Implementation Platform: Avnet Ultrazed-EV
The Avnet Ultrazed-EV is a system on module that is based on the Zynq Multi-
Processor System on Chip (Zynq MPSoC). It is an field programmable gate array
with the ARM cortex-A53 processor. Within the Zynq MPSoC resides a processing
unit alongside the programmable fabric. The HECAD system is designed to run in
the Zynq MPSoC, with the HRIM and the I2M residing in the programmable fabric,
and the FIM and EIM residing in the processing system. Communication across the
programmable fabric with the processing system is done using memory mapped AXI
transactions. In high performance processing, data can alternatively be streamed
upwards into the processing system, instead of using memory mapped IO. Previous
work to develop individual portions of HECAD (only the HRIM or I2M for a GPS
module) were implemented on the Zynq-7000 System-On-Chip. After designing the
HRIM and I2M for an additional UART devices (VACS Parser, explained below) and
designing the HRIM and I2M for the I2C device (MS5611 Barometer), the amount
of resources required to implement all of the logic exceeded the available amount in
the Zynq-7000 chip. As a result, the entire design was exported to target the Zynq
MPSoC.
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3.2 Monitored System: Aries Flight Controller
In order to understand the HECAD architecture, the sources of information from
which the data is coming to and from need to be identified. The purpose of HECAD is
to be able to pull data coming from the ground control station to the flight controller
and vice versa as well as GPS Module. This data is transmitted through the XBee
communication device, which communicates with the flight controller through the
UART bus. Next, data from the flight controller to the barometer sensors is pulled
through the I2C bus. As such, HECAD needs to be able to parse data from the I2C
bus and the UART bus.
The Aries flight controller is a heavily developed and tested flight controller that
has been built from scratch as a result of several years of research, development and
optimization by the VCU UAV laboratory. The Aries flight controller contains multi-
ple buses to communicate with the variety of peripherals as highlighted in figure 2-2.
On the I2C bus, there are 3 devices on the internal bus (barometer sensor, airspeed
sensor, and safety switch), and 2 devices on the external bus (compass and current
sensors). On the UART bus, there are 3 devices with several spares (mission control
system, ground control system, and global positioning system). Of these devices, the
barometer sensor and the GPS / VACS sensors are implemented in HECAD to ensure
correct functionality at the bus level and the information level.
3.3 Sensors
3.3.1 NEO-M8 GPS Module
The NEO-M8 GPS module by uBlox is a versatile GPS module that supports
multiple communication buses. For the purposes of this implementation, the M8
module is configured to UART at 115200. The M8 module allows for the NMEA
sentences protocols, and communicates with the flight controller through the UART
configuration. Out of the box configurations for the M8 module may not have the
device configured to a UART port at 115200 baud. As a result, the flight controller
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runs a series of codes, trying several options of baud rate until an understandable set
of data is returned. This causes issues for HECAD as explained later.
3.3.2 VACS Packet Transmitter
The Virginia Commonwealth University Aerial Communication Standard (VACS
Packet) is the communication protocol that is used by the Aries flight controller to
communicate with the ground control station. The VACS packet is transmitted over
an XBee wireless link. The XBee device communicates with the flight controller and
the ground control station through UART.
For a specialized VACS packet, each byte of data represents a special header indi-
cating sync bytes, destination address, source address, message id, data length, and
checksum. As the name(s) suggests, the source indicates its source of transmission,
the intended destination, the message header, the length of the message, the data
payload, and the checksum. The checksum for the VACS packet is calculated as
follows:
checksum A = checksum A + current byte
checksum B = checksum B + checksum A
The checksum calculation does not include the sync bytes or the checksum bytes
transmitted by the sender. Each of these bytes has their own ranges, and every time
they are read in from the HRIM, they are stored and checked against the expected
ranges. For each packet that is transmitted, a checksum is calculated separately in
real-time. If there is a mismatch in the checksum values reported, then an error flag is
thrown, indicating at some point the data that has been transmitted has been either
modified or dropped.
3.3.3 MS5611 Barometric Pressure Sensor
The MS5611 is a barometric pressure sensor with the ability to communicate
with devices over both I2C and SPI communication devices. It allows for a 24-bit
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ADC pressure and temperature value. The pressure and temperature has a 0.01
millibar and 0.01 Celcius precision respectively. Similar to the NEO M8 and the
VACS Packets, the MS5611 barometer sensor contains fields, including calibration
data, digital values and conversion values. Each of these has their own specified
absolute and recommended register size bounds. What this means is that even if
there is a recommended data type, the actual data size returned by the slave device
may not use up all of the bits. For example, the MS5611 contains a register that has
the difference between the reference and actual temperature. Even if the suggested
register size is a signed 32 bit integer, the actual value returned contains a range of
a 25 bit signed integer. For each of the registers, the ranges are checked for absolute
values to ensure nothing reported is out of range.
The checks as described above are designed as rationality checks to detect any
reported values that are not possible as shown in the data sheet. Within the I2M
is where large deltas and discrepancies are detected as well. In the example of the
MS5611, calculating the temperature and pressure will allow for range checking. A
large delta or change between two samples may occur, but because the I2C bus
operates at a high speed capacity, it is more realistic to keep a running average and
throw an alert if the average changes by a certain threshold. The data is kept in an
array, keeping a record of the average across the size of the array, for example 10
samples. If the averages change drastically (depending on the threshold that needs
to be set), then an alert is thrown. A similar approach is taken for samples that are
all zeroes, or all ones or flatlining in general. Realistically, they may return values
that are very close to zero or ones or a set value. By taking the running average,
any indication that the average is not changing indicates a no response or flatlined
system. As a result, this will throw an error.
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3.4 Communication Buses
3.4.1 UART & Vulnerabilities
The verification of the sensors at the bus level ensures correct functionality at
the specific configuration at startup. The UART communication port is generally
configured in a specific manner. This will typically be the transmission of data at
a specific baud rate or correct number of data bits and start / stop and parity bits.
As explained previously, there are two devices on the UART bus: a GPS module
with NMEA sentences, and an Xbee device transmitting VACS packets. Both of
these devices are configured to communicate with the flight controller over UART at
115200 speed, 1 stop bit, and no parity bits.
When a UART device attempts to communicate with a microcontroller at a con-
figuration unknown to the microcontroller, several issues can happen. If the data is
not received at the correct speed, the data received will be jumbled and not inter-
pretable. If the timing for the baud rate is very large, control over the sensor will be
lost, as there will be no way to know the status of the device (still transmitting, idle,
stopped, etc). Attacks at this level can jam the UART bus with invalid or scrambled
data.
3.4.2 I2C & Vulnerabilities
The I2C communication is a shared communication bus between devices. The
master device can share a bus with multiple slaves, and the correct functionality
depends on the master device correctly identifying a valid slave address. With correct
operation, the master device will send the slave address (a 7 bit address) along with
a 0 write bit / 1 read bit, receive acknowledgement from the respective slave. Next,
the master will send a command (8 bit command), receive acknowledgement from the
slave, and then the master will send the slave address again with a 0 write bit / 1
read bit if the command is intended to read data, or a 1 write bit / 0 read bit if the
command is intended to write data to the slave. If the write bit is a 0, the slave will
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send data back. If the write bit is a 1, the slave will acknowledge and wait for the
next byte of data to be received. Communication between either devices relies on the
SDA data line and the SCL clock line.
The operation of the I2C relies on the responsiveness of the SCL and SDA lines.
The SCL lines allow for the clocking of the data out, and the SDA lines allow for the
data to be changed when clocked out. If the SCL line is not responsive, it safe to
assume that either the master device is holding the SCL line high or low(failing to
clock data out), or that the slave device is holding the SCL line high or low (slave
has stopped responding or timed out). Similarly, if the SDA fails to change, and if
the SDA line is high, then either the master device has failed to acknowledge the
data, or the slave has failed to acknowledge the command. Attacks at this level can
manipulate either line to either lockup the bus, or to manipulate the data going in
either direction.
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Chapter 4
Implementation of HECAD Hardware
and Information Monitors
There are two main protocols that will be explored in this implementation: Univer-
sal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter (UART), and Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C),
also commonly known as the Two-Wire Interface over three levels of the HECAD
hierarchy: HRIM, I2M, FIM. Each of the different sensors will communicate with the
flight controller through a specific bus. At the lowest level of abstraction, a Hardware
Resource Integrity Monitor (HRIM) is implemented in hardware to be able to detect
correct and incorrect sensor functionality at the bus level. One level up, the Informa-
tion Integrity Monitor is implemented in hardware to validate information integrity.
One level higher above the I2M, an FIM is implemented to hold all valid data com-
ing into HECAD from the two communication buses, but no further implementation
is done for the FIM due its being out of scope. Figure 4-1 shows the implemented
architecture of HECAD, with the expanded devices on each communication bus. For
the purposes of this thesis, the detection logic for the various different attacks appli-
cable to a GPS module, a VACS Packet transmitter, and a MS5611 barometer are
implemented, and mitigation techniques are explored.
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Figure 4-1: Implemented HECAD Architecture in Zynq MPSoC for I2C and UART
Devices
4.1 Hardware Resource Integrity Monitor
In this implementation, the target of the HRIM was to be able to detect three
main things: a change in the baud rate, unexpected parity and to verify the start and
stop bits. An existing HRIM for the UART is taken from [1], and modified to work
with the updated baud rate configuration. Using oversampling, a baud rate change
is detected if there is a bit change outside of the middle of an oversampling clock. An
oversampling clock of 16 times the baud rate is used along with a 16 bit register. If a
change has occurred in the middle of the oversampling clock, half of the shift register
capturing the data from the baud rate clock should be low and half should be high
and vice-versa depending on the bit change. If the baud rate is different from what is
expected, then this condition will fail. If there is a non-one parity detected, no stop
bit detected, or more than 8 data bits at a time, then the HRIM will throw an error
for the respective case. Since the UART device is the same for both devices, the logic
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to detect errors is the same for both. Since UART is not a shared bus, the HRIM
for UART is duplicated, despite having the same logic. In section 4, a more specific
VHDL approach is described.
In developing the hardware resource integrity monitor for the two-wire interface,
many of the concepts implemented for detecting changes on the UART bus can be
carried over. Similarly, an HRIM has been adopted to parse the I2C data coming in
from the MS5611 barometer sensor. For this sensor, several checks are implemented
at the I2C HRIM. This includes the address bytes, the command bytes, and the
characteristics of the SCL / SDA line.
Starting with the speed of transmission, it is known that the internal I2C bus
needs to run at a specified speed. In this case, the speed of the bus is configured
to be 336 kHz. From this, a frequency check can be made to ensure that the bus
operates at the right speed within a certain threshold, typically a few percentages.
Given the known frequency, the period of each SCL pulse is also known. Using the
system clock of 50 Mhz, a calculation is made to determine how many system clock
cycles are allocated to each SCL clock pulse. This same check can be applied for
the SDA, but instead of frequency of the SDA line, the responsiveness is checked to
ensure there is activity on either line.
In addition to the SDA and SCL line checks, address checking and command
checking will be done at the HRIM. Address checking needs to be completed in order
to properly parse data for incoming data. Because the I2C is a shared bus between
multiple devices, the I2C protocol depends on the master communicating with the
right slave device through addressing. For the I2C bus, the HRIM contains a parser
that checks for a start and a stop condition, pulling in data when it detects a master
read operation and checking commands when it is a master write operation. When
there are multiple devices on the bus, the addresses are checked across all slave device
addresses to ensure that the master is attempting to communicate with valid slave
devices. Command checking can be a little more difficult. If the commands are to
be checked in the HRIM, then all commands across all slave devices will need to be
checked. As a result, the logic for the HRIM will increase exponentially. It is more
42
beneficial to combine individual command checks to the I2M for the I2C device, where
the I2M is tailored to each specific sensor. This is further explained in section 4.
4.2 Information Integrity Monitor
On another level in the HECAD hierarchy, data may be able to pass the HRIM
checks, but perhaps the data may not meet sensor specifications. For example, the
communication link between a UAS and a ground controller may contain data that
is organized into a specific protocol. The communication link between the ground
controller and the flight control system transmits data packets organized in the VCU
Aerial Communication Standard. While the UART components transmitting these
VACS packets may be operating correctly, the data received at either end may not
be. Over a wireless link as shown in figure 4-2, dropped data packets are common,
resulting in entire packets if not partial parts of a data packet missing when received.
As a result, partial data is received. In alternative cases, checks for information
integrity are not limited to information formation such as a VACS packet. In specific
sensors interfaced over SPI or I2C, it is harder to distinguish packets from raw data
versus well formed data, especially since each sensor may transmit data differently.
As a result, different sensors will have different checks put in place. The I2M is
introduced, allowing for sensor information integrity verification at the information
level. At this level, the I2M knows only about the type of information to be expected
for the respective sensor. Since every sensor is almost guaranteed to transmit data in
their own order and have their own register maps, a dedicated I2M needs to be made
for individual sensors.
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Figure 4-2: Communication Link between the UAS and the GCS
4.3 Functional Integrity Monitor
On an entire higher level of operation, an attack to the UAS can successfully pass
the checks at the information and hardware level, and ultimately target the operation
of the flight control system itself. While an adversary may not have direct access to
the system, an attacker may be able to repeatedly spoof the data in such a way that
slowly brings the system down. For a man-in-the-middle attack between the flight
controller and the ground control station, an attacker may be able to listen in and
successfully manipulate data that then gets sent out to its original destination. If
an attacker wants to be able to bring down the UAS all-together, they may attack
the reference points of the orientation and positional sensors to trick the system into
going in a certain direction. A common example is a spoofing attack on the GPS
sensor to slowly force the UAS to drift off into an opposite direction. In either case,
bus transfer protocol will be correct, and information will still be well formed by
the sensor. The Functional Integrity Monitor (FIM) is then introduced to monitor
all of the data coming in from all of the sensors at any given point in time. Here,
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the validity of the data from the sensors is not checked byte-by-byte or at the bus
level, but rather multiple points of data will be taken over time. A higher level of
processing is performed on this set of data to make sure that the data looks reasonable
with respect to expected data values and mission-specific data. Multiple algorithms
will be explored and evaluated in future work. In the previous section, the idea of
taking a running average will be more useful and easily implemented here. Several
running averages are taken for the pressure and temperature values.
4.4 Hardware Validation Checks
The detection at the hardware level allows for the ability to find faults at the bus
level. Often times, an attack coming in from the outside may target the configuration
of communication protocols. Some of these examples include changing the config-
uration of the UART ports or manipulating the I2C lines during operations. The
following sections describe the process of detecting hardware faults and unexpected
configurations.
4.4.1 UART
The detection and parsing of a UART bus utilizes an oversampling clock and a
16 bit shift register. Upon detecting a start bit, the over sampling clock counts until
the middle of the start bit (8 clock cycles). From here, the counter is reset and starts
counting until 16 oversample clocks have passed. When this happens, this will place
the counter in the middle of the first transmitted bit. A secondary counter keeps
track of how many bits have been received. Once a total of 8 bits have been received,
the 9th bit is expected to be the stop bit. If this condition fails, then there is likely an
issue with baud rate, the number of data bits, or the parity bit. This state machine
is illustrated in figure 4-3.
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𝑖𝑑𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑡
oversample_count == 8, oversample_count = 0
oversample_count == 16, bits_rcvd = bits_rcvd + 1
bits_rcvd < 8
oversample_count = 0
bits_rcvd == 8
next_bit_rcvd == 0
next_bit_rcvd == 1
Figure 4-3: UART HRIM State Machine
Baud Rate
In order to be able to detect a change in baud rate, an oversampling clock is
used. The oversampling counter is started when the start bit is detected, and then
the counter is reset when the middle of the start bit is detected. In the next iteration
when the oversampling clock reaches 16, the first transmitted bit is received. This
bit is then shifted into an eight bit shift register. If the baud rate of the UART
transmission is correct, the bit change will occur approximate halfway through a
16 bit count iteration. Within the shift register data, the upper 8 bits (previous
transmitted bit) should equal the lower 8 bits (next transmitted bit) when an XOR
operation is done across the bits. For example, a shift from a ’0’ to a ’1’ will result
in the shift register containing:
0000000011111111
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Where the leftmost value is the first bit transmitted (less significant bit) and the
right most value being the second bit transmitted (more significant bit). If there is
no bit change, and the previous bit was a ’0’, and the new bit is a ’1’, then the shift
register will contain:
0000000011111111
Similarly, if the previous bit was a ’0’, and the new bit is also a ’0’, then the shift
register will stay the same. On the contrary, if the previous bit was a ’1’, and the
new bit is a ’0’, then the shift register will contain:
1111111100000000
If the previous bit transmitted is a ’1’, and the new incoming bit is a ’1’, then the
shift register will contain:
1111111111111111
By checking the the XOR operation of the upper 8 bits and the lower 8 bits, it
can be determined if there is a timing or framing issue. If the data that is being
transmitted matches the expected baud rate, then data should settle into the shift
register as expected. If the baud rate is higher or lower than expected, then the
switching point will be skewed either to the left or the right when a bit change is
detected. Figure 4-4 shows an example at 115200 baud rate. The state machine does
not detect how many stop bits there are, rather just detecting a stop bit and then
waiting for the next start bit for transmission.
47
Figure 4-4: Sampled UART Transmission at 115200, 2 stop bits
At approximately 10900, the strobe on q_enable indicates the midpoint of the
second transmitted bit. This bit is a 1. The first bit transmitted is a 0, shown at
approximately 10500, where the data is shifted into the shift register. At 10700, it is
the rising edge of the second transmitted bit. At this point in time, the second bit is
shifted into the 16 bit register. Since the first half that has been shifted in is all 0’s,
the second half of the shifted register is all 1’s. Since the timing is expected, exactly
half of the shift register is all 0’s and the other half is all 1’s. The XOR operation
on the upper half results in 0, and the XOR operation in the lower half results in 0.
This indicates no error with the baud rate.
1111111100000000
In a figure 4-5 is a simulation of a UART transmission running at a slower rate.
While the transmitted data captured is valid, a quick look at the tx line can easily
distinguish a baud rate issue. After the 8th bit of transmission, the stop bit is expected
to be present. A 0 bit is still present, and as a result, an error is thrown. The state
machine is expecting it to be the 9th bit, the stop bit, but in reality, it is most likely
5th or 6th bit in the transmission.
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Figure 4-5: Sampled UART Transmission at 57600
Parity
The configuration for the UART transmission can be done with an optional parity
bit. If this parity bit is transmitted, then an even parity bit will be ’1’ if the number
of 1’s in the transmitted byte is odd, and ’0’ if it is even. On the contrary, an odd
parity bit will be ’1’ if the number of 1’s in the transmitted byte is even, and the
parity bit will be ’0’ if it is odd. In simpler terms, the parity represents the next bit
to be added to make the number of 1’s within the transmission either odd or even.
Stop Bits
The state machine developed for detection is designed to be able to detect the
existence of a stop bit. If there is at least one, even if there is one and half or
two, then it registers the transmission as successful. In the testing process, the state
machine is tested with a single byte of data. The state machine looks for a stop bit,
and the first stop bit detected by the state machine will reset the state machine to
the idle state after a successful transmission. The overhead is not significant enough
to cause a framing issue.
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4.4.2 I2C
Within the hardware of the I2C, there are many opportunities to check for the
correct operation of the I2C bus. Many of the concepts from the HRIM in the UART
protocol carries over. Of these concepts, generally clocking frequency and responsive-
ness of the SCL and SDA lines are checked. At hardware level, since checking for
the correct addresses allows for determining if the master is attempting to commu-
nicate with a valid device, then addressing and command checking are validated as
well. While address checking and commands across all devices on the hardware level
may provide advantage in identifying incorrect address and command operations, the
combination of the number of commands and the number of devices makes the logic
within the HRIM too large to be implemented. It is more efficient to complete this
task in the I2M, where there is a dedicated I2M per slave device.
The I2C parser looks for the transactions as described in 4.4.2. The HRIM for
the I2C device looks for a start condition, followed by the address of the slave. Once
the address is received and validated, the HRIM looks for a slave acknowledge. Next,
the read / not write bit is examined, and if it is a read, then the state machine pulls
in the next byte along with a master acknowledge. If there is no acknowledge, the
state machine returns to idle. If there is, the state machine looks for the next byte
of data, and checks the master acknowledge again. This process will repeat as long
as there is a master acknowledge. If the state machine is to perform write operation,
the state machine picks up the next byte of data and looks for the slave acknowledge.
This state machine is illustrated in figure 4-6.
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Figure 4-6: I2C HRIM State Machine
Slave and Master Acknowledgement
The state machine demonstrated in Figure 4-6 is used to parse data accordingly.
Both the slave and master devices acknowledge the data received from the transmitter.
However, the general acknowledgements by the slave devices must be made to ensure
the slave can respond accordingly. In industry standards, the I2C bus models pull-up
resistors. As a result, a high or undriven value indicates a no response from the slave
or master depending on who is sending the data. In order to ensure that the master
or slave is able to respond, the SDA lines need to be pulled down from either ends on
the rising end of the SCL clock. If there is no acknowledgement, then this indicates
either the end of the transmission or the failure to respond.
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SCL Rate
When the clocking frequency is known for the SCL bus, then so are the periods
of the high and low cycles of each clocking period. A state machine is developed
here where both the frequency and the duty cycle of the pulse are checked. Upon
detecting a start condition (when the SDA line drops when the SCL line is high), a
counter starts to check the initial response of the SCL line (when SCL drops low). If
the SCL line fails to drop low after a full cycle, then it is assumed to be held in high.
Similarly, each transition during the transmission period is checked for each high and
low cycle of the SCL clock pulses. If the clock stays too long in the low or the high
cycles, then it gets thrown into an error state. Given the speed of the system clock,
the number of system clock cycles is calculated to allow for checking of the SCL line.
For example, for the configuration with a 50 Mhz clock and a clock speed of 336
kHz, there needs to be no more than 148 system clock cycles in the entire period, or
half for each rising / falling period:
50𝑀𝐻𝑧
336𝑘𝐻𝑧
=
50000000
336000
= 148 (4.1)
To avoid a strict bound, a certain percentage of error is given to the frequency to
get a high bound and a low bound. For each high and low frequency, the maximum
number of cycles is recalculated, and is used as the bounds in the frequency checker.
If the number of clock cycles that has passed for each period falls below or exceeds
the bounds, then the frequency for the measured SCL clock is higher or lower than
expected. This results in an error with the clocking speed of the bus.
The same concept can be used to detect inactivity on the lines. After a start
condition is detected, the SCL lines can possibly be held low or held high forever.
The condition for a start condition is the falling edge of the SDA line while the SCL
line is high, so the next step is to check for a SCL line held high. After the falling
edge of the SDA line, the SCL line should drop no more than half the period later.
However, because the duty cycle isn’t necessarily 50 percent as in the ideal case, this
threshold can be increased or decreased. If the SCL line is still high after this time,
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then there is an issue on the bus and it is assumed that the line is not responding.
Similarly, the SCL line stuck low error can occur if the number of system clock cycles
bypasses that same threshold after the start condition.
A slave timeout can occur as well, and this error can be detected at either the
HRIM or the I2M level. If after a certain amount of time has passed and there has
been no activity from the lines, then it is safe to assume that there is no response. A
bidirectional checking can be done from both the master and the slave devices. If the
master sends the command and there is no acknowledgement for several commands,
then the slave has timed out. Similarly if the slave returns data but there is no
acknowledgement for the first byte of data returned, there will be a timeout. However,
the state machine adapted to parse data in from the bus line will prevent reading in
the first place if the slave device does not respond with an acknowledgement, even if
the address is correct. This leads to the assumption of no activity. The detection of
no activity on the SDA and SCL lines can indicate a bus crash as well. Generally, if
the flight controller is functioning as expected, and it is constantly requesting data,
then there needs to be activity on the SCL bus, at the very least. If there is no
activity, it indicates a crash of the flight controller, or the slave is holding the SCL
line low.
Command Checking
For the purposes of this implementation, the slave command checks are placed
at the I2M level. Although the command checking can be placed within the I2M to
minimize logic, the same effect can be achieved by using a state machine to check for
valid addresses and commands. State machine 4-7 describes the process.
Figure 4-7 describes the process of checking for valid commands. The state ma-
chine starts off in an idle state, and upon detecting the address of the slave device
of interest, then the state machines moves to a state waiting for the next command.
Here, if a command is received and it is valid, then we move to a valid state, which
then moves immediately back to the idle state. However, if the command is wrong, or
if the command is never received, then the state machine moves to an invalid state.
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Figure 4-7: Command Checking State Machine
4.5 Information Validation Checks
While the detection at the hardware level may validate data, it only verifies that
the data is operating within the specifications of the communication protocol. Data
that has been validated at the hardware level may contain malicious data or data
injected from a secondary source. The following sections describe the process and
implementation of the different applicable checks at the information level.
4.5.1 Range
For every known register that a slave device is reporting, the corresponding data
type and data range is checked. It is crucial to ensure that there is no out of range
values returned because the data range may not take up the full range of a recom-
mended data type. If there are out of range values, these issues will cause problems
for other inner conversion calculations that need to be performed.
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4.5.2 Flatlining
A check for flatlining is very straightforward. On the receiving end of the data
(after the master has requested a valid register), the data can be validated against
4 metrics: all 0’s, all 1’s, same value, and same running average over a certain time
window. The first two metrics can be tricky. Since data structures in which the data
does not take up the entire structure are managed, comparing them to all 1’s or all
0’s are theoretically incorrect.
For example, suppose a register value is recommended to be a 16 bit signed value.
This means that the range of values that can be returned is -32678 to 32767. But the
sensor only returns values from -4000 to 8000. The extra overhead is used to store
values resulting from arithmetic values used for other necessary calculations. The all
1’s or all 0’s for both the full range would result in -1 and 0, and which would be
useless if we are looking at practical uses. The more applicable approach would be to
check if the value is constantly -4000 or 8000, or constantly any number in between,
since the sensor cannot return a value outside of this range. If it does, it will be
caught in the range checking section.
On the other hand, detecting a non-changing value or a running average that has
not varied by more than a specific threshold is a little more straightforward. For
detecting a non-changing value, a process dedicated to the register or signal is used.
A synthesized and implemented design checks the value of the register or signal every
clock cycle, and a counter can be used to check the value of the register or signal
every certain amount of time. If there is no change in the signal over a long period
of time, then there is an issue with the data sent by the slave.
A similar approach is used when detecting a change in the running average of
the data. Instead of checking the sample every clock cycle, a counter register can be
used to add in a sample every time new data is read from the slave. Then, every
new sample that comes in after a set amount (say 20 samples), the oldest sample
can be removed, and the new sample can be added in. The new average is then
recalculated. From here, the new average is compared to the old average, and if there
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are no differences from the two, there is an issue with the data coming in and it will
trigger an error. However, this is a very strict implementation, and the presence of a
noise will most likely represent a change in the average. The more realistic approach
is to keep the running average, but if the differences between a new and a old average
has not differed by a set threshold, then there is an issue with the data. This takes
a large amount of resources to maintain in the programmable fabric. The alternative
to checking running averages is to do this process in the FIM, where it is easier to
setup average checking over a set amount of due to the available data structures.
4.5.3 Discrepancy and Large Delta Changes
Detecting large discrepancy changes can be approached the same way as flatlining,
but rather than comparing a current value with a sliding average of past values, a
change in any two samples that are large will trigger an error. For example, in the
MS5611, several processes were used to calculate the temperature and temperature
compensated pressure. Between any two calculated samples, if there is a large enough
change by 0.5 degrees (temperature) or 0.5 mbar (pressure), then an error is thrown.
The problem with this is that this method is checking for changes between two
samples. Since this is a high speed bus, a practical fault (where the UAS is experienc-
ing non-ideal environmental conditions), a sudden change in temperature or pressure
will not necessarily be caught between two samples but rather over a large set of
samples. Nevertheless, it is still important to have this check.
To solve the issue of discrepancy for a practical application, one would need to
take the same approach as the flatlining approach: taking a running average, and
checking for a change in the samples. Alternatively, another approach can be done
by looking at the minimum and a maximum over a set of samples, and taking the
difference between the two. This is a simpler approach to finding discrepancies, but
may not necessarily cover a gradual change in data. The same ideas can be applied
to longitude, latitude and altitude for a GPS module. Any sudden changes to any of
these fields by either an average or a high to low will indicate a fault.
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4.6 Information Flow
As explained previously, the information flows from the HRIM to the I2M to
the FIM. While the HRIM is important in detecting higher level attacks, the imple-
mentation of the FIM is out of scope for this project. An HRIM and the I2M is
implemented.
At the HRIM level, the hardware logic listens in on the bus and packages data
into different bytes accordingly. For each set of data, the data is packaged into single
bytes. For both the UART parser and the I2C parser, there is a state machine that
checks for correct configuration in the UART and the addresses and the required
slave acknowledge or master acknowledge. Every 8 bits of information that comes
into the HRIM is packaged into an 8 bit register that is then passed onto the FIM.
As explained previously, there are two devices that communicate on the UART bus.
There is the NEO-M8 GPS module, and there is the VACS Protocol. For both UART
buses, there are checks put into place the verify baud rate, parity, and start or stop
bits.
At the I2M level, the data is interpreted in context. For the VACS packet parser,
information such as the checksum validation bytes are checked. For the MS5611
barometer sensor, information such as temperature or pressure as well as their re-
spective ranges are checked. Given the data sheet information, the suggested data
types are used and the absolute ranges are given. Since the full range of the data
type are often much larger than what can be reported by the sensor, a large part of
the ranges are not used. This provides an opportunity to check for data ranges for all
applicable data registers within the sensor. This is applied to both the VACS parser
and the MS5611 barometer.
While the development of the FIM is out of this scope, the presence of memory
mapped registers in the programmable fabric allows for data to travel up from the
HRIM to the I2M and then up to the FIM through memory mapped registers. Only
valid data as determined by the HRIM and the I2M is forwarded into the FIM. Figure
4-8 shows the flow of data all the way up from the communication bus to the highest
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level of the HECAD system.
Figure 4-8: Information and Error flow within HECAD
4.7 Data Management
The HRIM does not consist of many data management layers, since it is simply
checking the operation of the communication bus itself. While the HRIM can be used
for many other checks besides bus operation verification, this version only checks for
bus operation. As a result, there are generally no data to be managed here, except
an 8 bit shift register and an 8 bit slave register for comparison. Here, both HRIM
modules package incoming data into this shift register to be output to the FIM. For
the HRIM in the I2C bus, the slave address register is used to verify the slave devices
the master is attempting to communicate with is valid.
The data within the I2M is more in depth and detailed, and generally deals with
the internal operations. For sensors such as the MS5611, there are additional opera-
tions that need to be completed before the data becomes relevant. For example, the
MS5611 first reports calibration data such as pressure and temperature sensitivity,
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temperature and pressure offset, and reference temperature. From here, the digital
temperature and pressure are reported, and the actual temperature is calculated by
the I2M using the coefficients and digital temperature and pressure. Then, the tem-
perature compensated pressure is calculated. Within the programmable fabric, each
of the values are stored in their respective and recommended data types. Using the
I2M I2C parser, data is stored when read in accordance to the register addresses as
described.
Within the FIM, data is stored as separate global registers. A specific register
is used for each field of data that is extracted from the I2M that is important to
determine a higher scale cyber-attack. For the MS5611 barometer, this will be the
pressure and temperature. For the GPS module, this will be timestamp, latitude,
longitude, and the altitude. For VACS, there are several fields of data extracted as
described in table 4.1.
VACS GPS MS5611
Sync1 Timestamp Digital Temperature
Sync2 Latitude Digital Pressure
Source Addr Longitude Calibration 1
Destination Addr Altitude Calibration 2
Low MSG ID Calibration 3
High MSG ID Calibration 4
Low Data ID Calibration 5
High Data ID Calibration 6
Low Data Length Actual Temperature
High Data Length Actual Pressure
Data Payload
Checksum A
Checksum B
Table 4.1: List of data fields - FIM
4.8 Error Management
In order to be able to manage data efficiently without locking up the HECAD
system, there are multiple ways to handle error. As demonstrated in the results
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section, there are instances where false data is injected into the system and HECAD
locks up into a failed state, waiting for the user to manually clear or reset the errors.
Implementing a lockup allows for users to be more directly involved with the HECAD
system to monitor faults and errors, but in exchange prevents the detection of faults
and errors that can arise during downtime. An initial startup of the flight control
system may have many configurations unfamiliar to HECAD unintentionally, and
can cause HECAD to trip to an error state. As a result, HECAD is correctly picking
up unfamiliar operations at startup, but prevents any other detections during actual
operation. This allows for an evaluation of the FCS startup code.
An alternative would be to allow the HECAD system to return to an idle state
update detecting the fault or an error. An error strobe would be used to notify
any of the higher up levels of HECAD along with any other debugging information
(slave timeout, data error ranges, data flatlining, etc). This allows for tracing of
system error during flight if the FCS ever crashes due to an unresponsive device or
component on-board.
By providing a way to inform the other levels of a fault or an error, the HECAD
system gives a channel of communication for HECAD to act as a secondary device
in future works. If HECAD is to be able to fully replace the flight control system
or provide a way to mitigate certain sensors and actuators, at the very minimum it
needs to be able to be able to identify the source of an issue and the type of issue to
take the appropriate action.
4.9 Mitigation Techniques
The detection of the existence of a cyber-attack allows for the intervention of a
human operator for resolution. However, because the HECAD system is intended to
run in real-time, requiring a user intervention can cause the HECAD system to fail
to detect more important security incidents, especially if the first incident detected is
minor. A modification to the error logic can be introduced to allow for intervention
if the severity of the error is high enough. From here, the HECAD system does not
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need to lock up, but rather the error logic can serve as a driver or enabler for the
control logic for mitigation techniques. If an error has been detected, several steps
can be taken as described below.
A safety switch component was imported in order to be able to allow a safety pilot
to take-over manual operation of the aircraft in the event that the automated code
on-board the aircraft fails or in an emergency where the pilot would need to take
over. Because the flight controller is modularized to work with any air frame, the set
of codes used for manual take-over will vary from frame to frame. For example, the
operation requirements for a tricopter will be significantly different from a quadcopter
which will be significantly different from a fixed wing vehicle. In all three frames, the
same flight controller can be used, but a different set of autopilot codes can be used
on the flight controller. The safety switch receives SBUS signals from the receiver and
the PWM signals are generated and forwarded to the flight controller for processing.
In the event anything in the autopilot software fails, or if there is any reason for
the autopilot to override the autopilot control, the safety switch will detect that the
manual mode switch has been triggered and will send the PWM signals directly from
the safety pilot operator to the actuators, bypassing the flight controller itself. As the
name suggests, the safety switch provides a mechanism for the safety pilot to control
the aircraft in the case the autopilot software fails.
The presence of the safety switch provides a mitigation technique for a malfunction
in the flight controller. However, ground pilots would only know there is an issue based
on a visual judgement on the aircraft. In other words, ground pilots would flip the
manual switch if it is determined to be in a failed state (when it does not appear to
be performing required actions for mission, or if it is failing to maintaining a flight
state). Because it is designed to be separate system from the flight controller, the risk
of the flight controller being compromised by third party vendors is minimal. There
is no way for the flight controller to communicate with the safety switch component.
Furthermore, the safety switch is maintained by developers, so the risk of infection
by a external attackers are also minimized. Nevertheless, additional monitoring of
the PWM and SBUS signals can be performed between the safety switch and the
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actuators, to ensure that the signals fall within specifications. This ensures that the
HRIM can verify that the PWM and SBUS signals measured are expected (never
100 percent or 0 percent duty cycle) and the FIM can detect sudden changes to the
actuators.
For hardware faults and cyber attacks detected on sensors, a method of mitigation
for sensor attacks is to either swap out or power cycle the modules themselves. For
example, a GPS module can experience a spoofing attack as described above. De-
pending on the GPS module, information regarding the signal strength and positional
data may be extracted. A sudden change in the signal strength to the satellites or a
change in the positional data may indicate an attack or fault [19]. If implemented,
both indicators of faults can be caught by either the I2M or FIM and the operator
can be notified, and the error signal can trip a power signal or be used to trigger
reconfiguration logic.
While a direct GPS spoofing on a unmanned system is difficult, the injection
of malicious firmware can provide the same effect of GPS spoofing attacks through
supply chain attacks. If the malicious firmware awakes during runtime and begins
to provide false data, then the unmanned system may no longer have a point of
reference for its position. With a presence of multiple GPS components from different
manufacturers, the prevention of a supply-chain attack may be picked up in the FIM
in exchange for placing more GPS modules on-board. This can be done by cross
referencing multiple unique GPS devices to ensure they agree with each other to a
certain degree. Another approach can be done by cross referencing the other sensors
utilized. By checking the changes in nearby sensors in the sensor network on-board,
the FIM can potentially pick up a mismatch in the data reported by other sensors
reference. For example, the FIM may receive false data reported by the compromised
GPS that the unmanned system has recently changed direction. If the movement
of the aircraft is independent on the IMU and barometer sensors, then checking the
recent events on the IMU and the barometer sensors will determine that there has
not been a change in the speed and direction of the aircraft as suggested by the GPS
module. However, this assumption is valid only in the case where the UAS does not
62
utilize only GPS data to influence its direction and orientation. In the case that it
does, then the barometer and the IMU will likely agree with the recent events as
reported by the GPS, because the changing of orientation of the aircraft is based on
the faulty GPS data.
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Chapter 5
Injection and Verification
5.1 Injection Process
The process of injection into the different levels of the HECAD system involves
separating the monitors out into their own workspace. When the inputs and outputs
are defined for each level, it is easy to introduce a set of inputs and the expected
outputs. For the UART HRIM, several VACS packets were sent at different config-
urations, including different baud rates, incorrect parity, and different data bit sizes.
For the I2C HRIM, the SCL lines were manipulated in many different ways to see if
the HRIM can detect a non-responsive data line.
In the I2M for the UART, a VACS packet parser was developed to ensure that re-
ceived packets are uniform and fully packed. This is done by calculating the checksum
in real-time. Similarly, the I2M for the I2C consisted of several validity, range and
flatlining checks. This includes valid command checking, calibration checking, out of
range checking, and pressure and temperature delta checking. These injections are
fully examined in section 6. In Figure 5-1, an example of injection when the HRIM
and I2M have been isolated is shown. At the HRIM, direct manipulations is done on
the communication lines (UART configurations, I2C SCL line manipulations). Sepa-
rating the outputs from the HRIM to the I2M, the I2M is injected with the different
types of data that can be returned from the device. Here, the assumption is made
that the data passes the HRIM configurations.
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Figure 5-1: Injection Testbed for the GPS module
5.2 Hardware Level Injection
The testing of the implemented HECAD system involves injection data into two
communication buses and four different components: the UART bus, the I2C bus, the
two HRIM modules, and the two I2M modules. Each component is tested individually
using a variety of methods. At the hardware level, data injected into the system
is transmitted at different configurations using an FTDI chip. Because the UART
configuration is expected to be at a transmission speed of 115200, no parity, and one
stop bit, data is transmitted otherwise to check the detection of the discrepancies.
Table 5.1 describes the injections into the HRIM module for UART devices.
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Type Target Field Coverage
Configuration Baud Rate Incorrect Baud Rate
Configuration Data Bits Incorrect Data Lengths
Configuration Parity Even Parity Existence
Configuration Parity Odd Parity Existence
Configuration Parity Space Parity Existence
Table 5.1: HRIM Injections for UART Bus
For the I2C, a similar approach is used. The two wire interface consists of the SCL
and SDA line used for bidirectional communication. First, a module to manipulate the
SCL line is used. This module generates SCL lines at different frequencies, different
duty cycles, lines that have been held high or low after a start condition and during a
transmission. A similar approach is used to generate an improper SDA line. However,
because the SDA generally represents data, the unexpected behavior of the SDA line
(no slave or master acknowledgement) will be caught by the state machine parsing
data coming into the HECAD system. Therefore, it makes sense for the data that is
sent on the SDA line to be validated by the I2M. Table 5.2 describes the injections
in the HRIM module for I2C devices.
Type Target Field Coverage
SCL Responsiveness SCL activity SCL held high after start
SCL Responsiveness SCL activity SCL held high during transmission
SCL Responsiveness SCL activity SCL held low after start
SCL Responsiveness SCL activity SCL held low during transmission
SCL Frequency SCL speed Frequency within a few percents of expected
SCL Duty Cycle SCL behavior Reasonable Duty cycle
Table 5.2: HRIM Injections for I2C Bus
5.3 Information Level Injection
Separating the I2M from the HRIM, each device is tested independently. This
allows for testing based on the known inputs and outputs as well as the correct type
of information. For the VACS transmitter on the UART bus, VACS will be injected,
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with both correct and incorrect checksum calculations, as well as correct calculations
but manipulated packets. This is to show that attackers may be able to change the
information, but fail to properly change the verification bytes. Several changes are
made, including the known fields and respective data lengths and types. Table 5.3
describes the injections at the I2M level for the UART VACS device.
Type Target Field Coverage
Checksum Checksum A Checksum incorrect
Checksum Checksum B Checksum incorrect
Data Change Message Fields Changed Data
Data Change Message Fields Dropped Data
Table 5.3: I2M Injections for VACS Device
For the MS5611 I2M device, injections involving every single field are considered.
The processing of setting up and reading from the sensors involves reading in the
calibration data, reading in digital temperature and pressure, and performing a cal-
culation to translate it into real, interpretable data. First, the injection of calibration
data is performed. There are two types of calibration injections: incorrect calibration
data injected during the first read by the master device, and correct calibration data
during the first read by the master device and incorrect calibration data injected dur-
ing the second read by the master device. This covers checking for initial calibration
data against known values and checking for changes in the calibration at any point
during run time. Next, the injection of commands is performed. Any commands that
are considered incorrect or unknown are ignored, and the HRIM throws an error. An
injection is performed before and after a valid command has been received. Finally,
changes in temperature and pressure injections are performed. Given that pressure
generally is adjusted for temperature, an injected value that changes the tempera-
ture will also change the pressure. The opposite is not true, injections involving only
pressure and only temperature are performed, and discrepancies large enough to be
detected are shown. Table 5.4 describes the injections at the I2M level for the UART
VACS device.
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Type Target Field Coverage
Calibration A1 Coefficient, First Read Unexpected Value
Calibration A2 Coefficient, First Read Unexpected Value
Calibration A3 Coefficient, First Read Unexpected Value
Calibration A4 Coefficient, First Read Unexpected Value
Calibration A5 Coefficient, First Read Unexpected Value
Calibration A6 Coefficient, First Read Unexpected Value
Calibration A1 Coefficient, Reread Changed Value
Calibration A2 Coefficient, Reread Changed Value
Calibration A3 Coefficient, Reread Changed Value
Calibration A4 Coefficient, Reread Changed Value
Calibration A5 Coefficient, Reread Changed Value
Calibration A6 Coefficient, Reread Changed Value
Commands All Commands Invalid command
Pressure Digital Pressure Large Change in Pressure
Pressure Digital Pressure Large Change in Pressure
Temperature Digital Temperature Large Change in Temperature
Temperature Digital Temperature Large Change in Temperature
Table 5.4: I2M Injections for MS5611
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Chapter 6
Preliminary Results and Verification
The goal of the HECAD system is to be able to identify any existing and incoming
hardware faults and incoming errors as a result of either intended cyber-attacks or
faulty hardware induced at any point of the development and distribution process
and communicate this information with an operator. As such, faulty data is injected
into the system at both the hardware and information level. In the previous sections,
types of attacks are injected and the results are explored here.
6.1 HRIM
6.1.1 UART HRIM
The UART HRIM primarily detects changes in the UART configuration as well as
changes in the information level on two devices: a GPS module and a VACS device.
The configuration for both devices stays the same: transmission at 115200, one stop
bit, and no parity bit. Correct GPS and VACS data is injected into the HRIM module
at several different speeds, and at different configurations as shown below. In figure
6-1, data is sent into the module at a baud rate of 9600. Since this is such a low baud
rate, the figure shows a couple of transmissions before the error is detected. This is
because the low baud rate and the high oversampling rate catch a large part of the
start bit as the transmission bits. After the first bit is actually transmitted, then the
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error is caught.
Figure 6-1: UART Injection at 9600 baud
In figures 6-2 and 6-3, data is sent into the module at a baud rate of 19200 and
57600 respectively. This is demonstrated to throw an error if the baud rate is a little
bit lower than the intended frequency. In figure 6-2, the start of the transmission
starts at approximately 29300, then after the first bit change, the error is caught.
Similarly, figure 6-3 demonstrates the same effect, where the start of a transmission
is at approximately 27500, and at approximately 31400 is the expected stop bit. In
both figures, the baud is so slow that the data transmitted is caught in between the
windows of the oversampling clock.
Figure 6-2: UART Injection at 19200 baud
The same experiments are used in figures 6-4 and 6-5 to demonstrate the same
functionality for baud rates at a higher rate than intended. In these cases, data is
sent into the module at a baud rate of 230000 and 500000 respectively. As expected,
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Figure 6-3: UART Injection at 57600 baud
the error is caught after a brief moment in both situations. This is because the point
at which the bit has changed is not exactly in the middle of a 16-bit register generated
by the oversampled clock.
Figure 6-4: UART Injection at 230400 baud
In addition to the change in the baud rate, a different configuration for the parity
bits was used. Since the state machine checks for a non-existing parity bit to be
transmitted, the state machine throws an error if the parity bit is a ’0’, regardless if
it is an even parity or an odd parity. A transmission of a ’1’ parity bit is considered a
correct transmission since it is detected as the stop bit. A similar case appears if the
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Figure 6-5: UART Injection at 500000 baud
the parity bit is a mark bit (where the bit is always a ’1’ and therefore is detected as
a stop bit) or if the parity bit is a space bit (where the bit is always a ’0’). In figure
6-6, at approximately 21910, the UART HRIM expects a ’1’ stop bit. The absence
of the stop bit throws the stop error. Figures 6-7 and 6-8 show a similar case, where
at the end of the transmission, a ’1’ stop bit is desired but a ’0’ bit is returned. Both
cases are caught by the UART HRIM.
Figure 6-6: UART GPS with Even Parity Bit
The final injection involving the UART configuration is the stop bits. The non-
existence of a stop bit is considered an error. However, the issue with injection is
that there is no module that can transmit without a stop bit. The FTDI and Putty
configuration does not allow the transmission of a byte without a stop bit. However,
the presence of a ’0’ bit when a ’1’ bit is expected in the previous examples shows
that the state machine can detect it as an error. In order to work with UART, the
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Figure 6-7: UART GPS with Odd Parity Bit
Figure 6-8: UART GPS with Space Parity Bit
next transmission requires the line to be pulled up high in order to have a start bit,
so eventually the line will represent a stop bit, only at the wrong time, indicating a
configuration error. The detection of two stop bits will not represent an error, since
HRIM is simply looking for the first stop bit it detects. The rest is considered part
of the idling period. Additionally, the overhead induced from the extra bit will not
be significant enough to cause a framing error or baud error. An example of this is
shown in figure 6-9.
In the previous section, it was noted that when the GPS module is initially config-
ured to its factory settings out of the box, the flight controller runs a setup procedure
where the flight controller attempts to communicate with the GPS module at differ-
ent baud rates until a common baud rate is achieved. From here, the flight controller
sends the commands to reconfigure the GPS module to the desired configuration. The
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Figure 6-9: UART GPS with Two Stop Bits
issue with this setup is, when the flight controller boots up, the HECAD system also
boots up, ideally at the same time. If the setup code attempts to communicate with
flight controller, then the HECAD system will catch the error in the initial commu-
nication configuration. This will cause state machine to run out of sync. The state
machine will have no way to distinguish the true start and stop points from the new
configuration. To solve this problem, the flight controller and the GPS module should
be configured to both communicate at the right configuration upon startup.
6.1.2 I2C HRIM
In the HRIM injection for the I2C device, the address validation still follows.
Furthermore, the more thorough checks for the I2C hardware bus involve the SCL line
and the SDA line to ensure that there is activity as well as response and frequency of
the response on the line. Upon detecting a start condition on the line, if the SCL line
is held low either after the start condition or during transmission, then the detector
will throw an error. Similarly, if the SCL line responds but gets stuck during the
initial transmission or during a transmission, then the detector will also throw an
error. Figures 6-10 and 6-11 show an injected and modified SCL line that is held
low after the start condition and during a transmission. After a approximately 75
percent of the SCL cycle has passed and no activity has been detected on the SCL
line, then the I2C HRIM throws an error. In figure 6-11, the SCL line is broken during
a transmission to show that the error can be caught outside of the start condition
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as well. The number that is used as a threshold (75) can be modified so that it can
catch the error after a longer or shorter amount of time, depending on the expected
SCL bus speed.
Figure 6-10: I2C SCL Held Low after Start condition
Figure 6-11: I2C SCL Held Low during transmission
Similarly, the same concept is used for the I2C lines being held high after the start
or during the transmission. Figures 6-12 and 6-13 show the detection of the SCL lines
held high after the start condition and during transmission.
Figure 6-12: I2C SCL Held High after Start condition
Checking the frequency of the SCL line is the next injection. If the frequency of
the SCL line is known, then checking the time between each rising and falling edge
of the SCL line will allow for checking of the frequency. If the frequency is off by
more than 5 percent, then the detector will also throw an error. Several injections
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Figure 6-13: I2C SCL Held High during transmission
are done to show that the HRIM can detect a change in frequency. For figure 6-14,
the frequency of the SCL line is modified to be 3.3 percent higher than the expected
frequency, running at 347222 Hz, or approximately 347 kHz. For figure 6-15, the I2C
SCL bus is modified to run at 250 kHz. For figure 6-16, the I2C SCL bus is modified
to run at 2 Mhz. This method of checking is a little more difficult, especially when
working with the actual speed of the SCL bus versus the intended speed of the bus.
During the experimentation, several attempts to measure the speed of the bus varied
between 312 kHz and 340 kHz. While this shows a reasonable drift on the bus, this
may cause a false positive in identifying malfunction incidents on the I2C bus. As a
result, the threshold in determining if there is a fault or an attack should be increased
to a larger number.
Figure 6-14: I2C Incorrect Frequency - 347222 Hz, +3.3 %
The HRIM also verifies the SCL duty cycle. If the frequency of the SCL line is
known, then generally so is the duty cycle. The injector used previously is modified to
output an SCL line with a different duty cycle that is unreasonable. In the injector,
the modified SCL line that is injected in the HRIM has a duty cycle of 80 percent. This
is to emulate an incorrect SCL line duty cycle, but not necessarily a non-responding
I2C SCL line. Figure 6-17 shows the detection of a responding SCL at the wrong
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Figure 6-15: I2C Incorrect Frequency - 250 kHz, -25.6 %
Figure 6-16: I2C Incorrect Frequency - 2 MHz, +495 %
duty cycle. Since the SCL lines driven by a master device generally do not have a
50 percent duty cycle, this check may not serve useful or important in determining
existence of faults.
Figure 6-17: I2C Incorrect Duty Cycle
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6.2 I2M
6.2.1 UART
The injection at the UART I2M at the information level consists of working with
changing VACS or GPS packets. To demonstrate a detection in the error of infor-
mation received, the injections performed here will involve changing parts of a VACS
packet, including the data section and the checksum section. Changing part of the
data will result in an incorrect checksum and changing the checksum will lead to an
error detection thrown by the VACS parser. The two types of injections are per-
formed and shown here. In figures 6-18 and 6-19, a valid VACS packet is injected,
but the checksum is changed. In figure 6-20, a VACS packet is injected, but parts of
the packet itself are changed. In any situation, changing different parts of the VACS
packet is an attempt to demonstrate the failure to receive uniform and unaltered data.
Figure 6-18: VACS Packet - Checksum A changed
Figure 6-19: VACS Packet - Checksum B changed
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Figure 6-20: VACS Packet - Data Payload changed
6.2.2 I2C
The injection at the I2C information level consists of several changes in the dif-
ferent registers that can be returned by the slave device. This is the more extensive
injections test. First, the calibration registers are validated. Every slave device has
factory burned data into the device memory, so the reading of the calibration registers
should never change. As a result, data from the calibration register is read in and
stored during the first iteration of the reading of specific calibration register and then
checked against that stored data during the next iteration. There are a total of six
different calibration registers. Figures 6-21 through 6-23 demonstrate the injection of
an incorrect data value during the first iteration. This is intended to check the data
read from the calibration registers. It is known what the calibration registers should
be.
Figure 6-21: I2C C1 Calibration Injection
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Figure 6-22: I2C C2 Calibration Injection
Figure 6-23: I2C C3 Calibration Injection
In the Aries flight controller, the autopilot code is set up to read the calibration
registers once, and then store those values in memory. In the case where data returned
is different, this can cause issues in calculations for the values that are calculated using
the calibration data. In order to demonstrate a change in the calibration data, two
iterations of reading calibration registers are performed: once with one set of data,
and again with a false set of data. Figures 6-24 through 6-26 show the injection of
the correct calibration value during the first iteration, and then a different calibration
value during a second iteration.
Figure 6-24: I2C C1 Calibration Change
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Figure 6-25: I2C C2 Calibration Change
Figure 6-26: I2C C3 Calibration Change
In addition to checking the calibration values in both initial setup and during
program operation, every command initiated and transmitted with the intended slave
address is checked against known commands. Given the datasheet for the MS5611,
there are a total of 14 available commands, eight of which are not used. This is
summarized in the previous section describing injection and validation techniques.
Figures 6-27 through 6-29 indicate several attempts to send invalid commands to the
correct slave address.
Figure 6-27: I2C Invalid Command Injection 1
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Figure 6-28: I2C Invalid Command Injection 2
Figure 6-29: I2C Invalid Command Injection 3
At the final injection step at the information level, a change in the pressure and or
temperature is injected. Since the pressure is temperature compensated and depends
on the temperature, a change in the temperature warrants a change in the pressure
by a large amount, but the opposite may not be a true. A change in the pressure
alone will not affect a change in temperature. This is demonstrated in Figures 6-30
and 6-31.
Figure 6-30: I2C Pressure Injection 1
82
Figure 6-31: I2C Pressure Injection 2
To demonstrate that changing the temperature also changes pressure, figures 6-
32 through 6-34 represent a change in pressure, a change in only temperature, or a
change in both that is significant enough to warrant an error alert.
Figure 6-32: I2C Pressure Injection
Figure 6-33: I2C Temperature Injection
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Figure 6-34: I2C Pressure and Temperature Injection
It is important to know that there are some assumptions being made here regard-
ing the parts of the data that are being manipulated. For example, the injections
involving the UART I2M VACS packets changed only a part of the data, either the
data payload or the checksum. Often times, a well-coordinated attack will consist of
attackers changing multiple parts of the protocol, especially if their goal is to be able
to inject data that is recognized as valid and reasonable. For this reason, an attack
that consists of injecting a data walkoff (where data drifts off constantly) will not be
detected (unless there is a large discrepancy between any two samples) at the HRIM
or I2M. A higher level of processing at the FIM will catch this data.
In many of the injections performed, HECAD demonstrated success detecting ab-
normalities throughout the system, at both the hardware and information level. At
the functional level, all of the valid data that has been received (GPS data, VACS
packets, and MS5611 data) at the hardware and information level are forwarded up-
wards and stored into global memory. From here, the higher level processing unit will
preform actions such as average tracking or a neural network based time series clas-
sification. While the different hardware and information integrity modules highlight
the errors that can occur during the transmission of data, the modules can further
be refined and tested to detect a more specific configuration, such as a single versus
two stop bits.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Works
7.1 Conclusion
Over the years as the capabilities of unmanned systems have evolved, their area of
applications have expanded. As a result, an increasing number of unmanned systems
have become available to the general public. There results more opportunities for
adversaries to find ways to reverse engineer these unmanned systems to gain access.
There is a rising importance to find ways to secure these unmanned systems against
ever evolving cyber-security threats.
A hierarchical embedded cyber-attack defense system is introduced and imple-
mented as a non-intrusive detection and mitigation mechanism to safeguard against
varying hardware faults and cyber-attacks. The HECAD system consists of a multi-
level hierarchical detection system implemented in a FPGA, consisting of programmable
fabric and a system on a chip. Within the programmable fabric resides the hardware
integrity and information integrity monitors, which is intended to safeguard against
false configurations and malicious information. Data is parsed from the communica-
tion bus in the HRIM and packaged into 8 bit registers to be sent up into the I2M.
Within the I2M, the data is interpreted to its context, and its respective values and
ranges are verified against what is known. If the data is valid, then the data is sent
up to the FIM. In the FIM, data is managed using multiple global registers.
The HECAD device is implemented to work across the UART communication
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bus and the I2C communication bus. On these two buses, the flight controller com-
municates with the ground control station, the GPS module, the barometer, and
several other devices. In this thesis, implementations for checking, injecting and val-
idating hardware configurations and operations along with information integrity is
implemented for the VACS Packets, the GPS modules, and the barometer over the
UART and the I2C bus respectively. This includes correct and incorrect UART con-
figurations (baud rate, data bits, and parity bits), I2C line behavior (SCL lines held
high or low), and VACS packet integrity (verification using checksums). Once valid
information has been checked and passed by both the HRIM and the I2M, the data
is then passed up to the FIM for further processing.
As shown in section 6, injections across both the hardware and information por-
tions of a sensor functionality were performed. This includes changing bus config-
urations, tapping into bus lines and manipulating clock and data lines, injecting
manipulated data packets for custom protocols, and injecting data against known
constraints provided by data sheets. The implemented HECAD system was success-
fully able to identify the various faults and attacks, alerting the operator along with
the error information.
7.2 Future work
In addition to the existing security checks implemented in place, the integration
of HECAD will pave the way for the additional security measures as well. By being
able to identify the sections of the UAS that have been compromised, HECAD will
have enough information to take targeted measures for specific communication buses
and devices. For specific devices, a simple power cycle will be sufficient to return the
device to a working state. For compromised systems, a tougher mitigation strategy
would need to be implemented.
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7.2.1 Power Cycling
For devices capable of being power cycled, providing control logic for HECAD to
power cycle certain devices would be a form of a mitigation strategy. If a commu-
nication bus fails to respond after a reasonable amount of time, reset logic can be
tied to the power transistors of the I2C devices and used to power cycle the device.
This way, there is the ability to repair a broken communication link without utilizing
more resources to completely swap out a device for a new one. This tackles the issue
of a malfunction on a communication bus, but not necessarily the malfunction of the
device itself, especially if there is active malware on the sensor.
7.2.2 Hot Swapping
The purpose of using a hierarchical detection system such as HECAD is to allow
for the detection of issues on hardware information and functional level. For devices
that have been compromised as a supply chain attack (intentionally or not) there may
be existing conditions on multiple levels of transmission. If there are enough evidence
of a sensor or component malfunction, then it gives HECAD enough grounds for it
to implement hot swapping logic. However, in the case of intentional supply chain
attacks, it would only prove beneficial if the device that is being swapped out comes
from a different supplier and distributor, all while maintaining performance and power
requirements.
The introduction of using hard swapping also gives the ability to potentially repair
devices. If a device has the ability to be repaired, then the hard swapping logic can
also have recovery logic tied in as well. This works especially with devices that have
been affected by single-event upsets and power cycling on the spot will result in an
significant downtime.
7.2.3 Intelligent Detection
The existence of the FIM and EIM is to be able to detect higher level attacks that
are not easily detectable at the hardware or information level. These generally overlap
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with a large portion of the supply-chain attack that manipulates attacks at a much
higher level. As an alternative to algorithms at the FIM level, a more open-minded
approach to detecting anomalies is to use a neural network or a convolutional neural
network to identify specific attack patterns on incoming data.
Convolutional neural networks trained to identify patterns and processes perform
better and more efficiently than rule based approaches such as supervised learning.
The concept may be applied here as well, where patterns and noise can be used as
training for the convolutional neural network. As a result, any unfamiliar behavior
that is happening with the UAS (sudden changes, drifts, plummets, etc) will trigger
an error. This approach works for mission-specific situations too. For waypoint-to-
waypoint missions, the behaviors described apply to a convolutional neural network.
Mission data fed into the network will serve as training for determining whether or
not UAS behavior is correct.
While the integration of a neural network is not imperative for proper functional-
ity, the ideal of self-awareness or reconfiguration paves the way for HECAD to act as
a secondary system. If HECAD can successfully identify issues with the flight control
system itself, HECAD can take over all of the subcomponents and act as a backup
flight controller.
7.2.4 HECAD as Flight Controller System
The HECAD system contains programmable fabric as well as a Quad-core, Zynq-
MPSoC processing system. The programmable fabric serves as hardware based veri-
fication logic to verify hardware and information level data. The A53 processor can
be used to run the FIM and communicate with the EIM. A final design should have
enough resources left over to run flight controller code. A part of the processor can
be dedicated to running the flight controller system.
An ideal system that comes together to form a minimally intrusive HECAD system
will consist of the programmable fabric used to verify data integrity at the HRIM and
at the I2M. As data comes into the HRIM, data is packaged and passed to the I2M
and then to the FIM. Within the FIM resides either a neural network or a simple
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processor alongside a backup flight controller system.
In the near future, different and more in-depth cyber-attack detection methods
and mitigation techniques will be added into the various parts of the HECAD system.
Within the FIM, higher level algorithms can be introduced, or the neural network
approach can be applied. The EIM will be introduced along with the single wire
interface to communicate with the main HECAD system for debugging and execution
analysis. If it is possible to isolate the cores and dedicate them to specific parts of
an application program, then one or two cores will be dedicated to running autopilot
code on the side. Several interfaces will need to be used to allow for proper routing
of components to the backup system. The combination of the different levels of the
HECAD system along with the backup flight control system will allow for a tightly
coupled secure UAS.
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